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SUBJECT: INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN IRAQ

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[1](#)B. (C) BAGHDAD 2736 (D) BAGHDAD 2737

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[1](#)1. (SBU) SUMMARY: At 2.2 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), Iraq now ranks third in the world among countries with IDP populations, behind only Sudan and Colombia. Such large-scale displacement in Iraq is producing potentially permanent social and religious segregation. Coordination remains weak among national and provincial institutions, as does coordination within the international humanitarian community; these deficiencies currently result in ad hoc responses to both ongoing IDP needs and to emergencies, such as the recent truck bombs in Ninewa province. The rate of displacement between February 2006 and June 2007 is higher than it was in the 2003-2005 period. A portion of this increase is attributable to improved registration in some areas but, in other areas, serious barriers to registration persist, and thus many displaced persons may not have yet registered. In what appears to be a sign that Iraq's institutions cannot keep up with the overwhelming demands placed upon them by continuing displacement, the Baghdad Provincial Council has announced that it will stop accepting IDP registrations as of September 20 for most applicants. Baghdad is the place of origin of an estimated 69 percent of IDPs displaced since the bombing of the Al-Askari shrine in Samarra in February 2006. USAID/DCHA/OFDA recommends a continued strategy of assisting IDPs in place, with a focus on livelihoods, host community support, and working with the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM) to continue IDP registration in all locations. In addition, the USG should work with the UN to move the newly appointed UN Humanitarian Coordinator's base to Baghdad from Amman, and to explore further GOI capacity building needs at both national and provincial levels, specifically to improve MODM's ability to assist IDPs and to respond to emergencies in general.

[1](#)2. (SBU) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Most of Iraq's displaced currently live in rented housing or with host families. The current trend in net increases of IDP numbers is likely to continue, and the absorptive capacity of host communities will depend on the length of conflict and the levels of security. The top three most frequently reported needs in both 2006 and 2007 are food, shelter, and employment. Nearly half of IDPs do not have access to the Public Distribution System (PDS) food baskets. Ongoing assistance programs geared toward IDPs in Iraq are limited to a handful of Iraqi non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); most international NGOs and most UN agencies are based in Jordan, not Iraq. The UN operates some programs through national NGOs as well, but UNHCR, which has a lead agency role for IDPs on a global level, sees its role for IDPs in Iraq as limited to protection, camp management, and emergency shelter. END SUMMARY.

Defining the Scope of the Problem

¶3. (SBU) Iraq has struggled with the problem of displacement of families and communities for the past four decades, but the current level of 2.2 million Iraqis officially internally displaced, combined with an estimated 1.8 million Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries, levels of displacement are unprecedented and affect all governorates. Iraq now ranks third in the world in terms of countries with internally displaced person (IDP) populations, behind only Sudan and Colombia, having this year surpassed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda.

¶4. (U) Most governorates are both receiving and generating IDPs, while the three northern governorates (Erbil, Dohuk, and Sulaymaniyah) mainly receive rather than generate IDPs. UN figures, drawn from GOI registration information, indicate that the increase from mid-May 2007 to end of June is double the average increase) approximately 190,000 people displaced in one and a half months, versus the previous average increase of just above 60,000 individuals per month. However, per the UN cluster responsible for IDP data, this increase is attributable to a combination of factors, including increased capacity of the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM) to register IDPs; improved transfer of data from the governorates to the central office in Baghdad; enhanced access (in the case of Baghdad) by IDPs to local MODM offices; some new displacement caused by inter-communal violence and military operations; and improved security in various areas to which IDPs may feel safer relocating because it is linked to their own tribal, sectarian or ethnic affiliation. Those areas where increased data entry (versus actual new displacement) plays a role are Baghdad, the south, and the north. Anbar is the only governorate where the

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provincial government registered the return of 2000 displaced families during the first half of 2007 to neighborhoods in Ramadi where military operations had ceased.

¶5. (SBU) The figures tell only part of the story. Such large-scale displacement in Iraq is producing potentially permanent social and religious segregation, which in turn may engender long-term political consequences for the country. The size and pace of displacement may exhaust the absorptive capacity of host communities, which will increase Iraqi dependence on external assistance. Iraqi officials in some areas have responded to ongoing displacement by blocking new IDP registration, and nearly half of IDPs do not have access to the Public Distribution System (PDS). Lack of strong national and provincial coordination mechanisms has, among other things, led to short-term solutions for assistance that may prove unsustainable over the long run and may detract from the ability to devise a broader strategy.

Who is an IDP?

¶6. (U) Iraq's population includes people displaced under diverse circumstances at different times, and who thus possess varying levels of coping mechanisms and needs. As one example, USAID/OFDA met on August 16 with the Dohuk IDP Coordinator for the province. In his estimation, the various waves of displacement since 1975 have cumulatively led to a situation in which 800,000 of Dohuk's 900,000 people could be characterized as displaced. Various events contributed to this large-scale displacement, including the de-villagisation, campaign; the Anfal campaign; the Arabization, campaign; fighting during the mid-nineties between the two Kurdish parties, and between the PKK and the Turkish military; Kurds expelled to Iran in the 1970s and now returning with no homes; Iraqis who fled

government-controlled territory under Saddam; Iraqis who fled the early stages of the war in 2003 and the ongoing fighting between MNF-I and insurgents; and the post-February 2006 surge in displacement.

¶17. (SBU) Another example of the diversity of Iraq,s displaced is that of the Kurdish Herki tribe in Ninewa, who collaborated with the Saddam regime in the struggles against the Barzani and Talibani Kurds in the 1980-1990s and who were settled in poor conditions in military forts in Bartallah, Ninewa. With the fall of Saddam, thousands more Herki from across northern Iraq fled to Bartallah and settled in several more of the military forts, living in similarly squalid conditions, where food, water, and health services continue to be scarce. Some 300 families now reside in each of five forts, with thousands of other Herki living in tents and other primitive structures nearby. The Mosul PRT is currently seeking a durable solution for this group.

¶18. (U) The current levels of displacement country-wide are due largely to sectarian violence in the wake of the bombing of the Al-Askari shrine in Samarra in February 2006. In its 2007 Mid-Year Review,, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) depicts Samarra as a turning point that triggered the targeting of religious and ethnic identities and movement of IDPs from &religious and ethnically mixed communities to homogenous ones.8 (REFs (A) and (B).) Drawing from figures kept by the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MODM), IOM states that whereas approximately 400,000 Iraqis were displaced between 2003 and 2005 as a result of military operations, crime, and general insecurity, the period of February 2006 through June 2007 saw approximately 1.1 million Iraqis displaced. This massive increase in displacement occurred primarily due to sectarian violence, though general lawlessness and, to a lesser extent, military operations, also played a role. This analysis, as well as a good deal of what is known of current displacement, is based on a system of elaborate, continuous surveys and needs assessments conducted so far in 15 governorates by various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and consolidated by IOM to complement the registration work conducted by MODM. The USG funds the surveys and the overall consolidation and analysis.

¶18. (U) IOM also reports that while IDPs are predominantly Arab, minorities are increasingly targeted. The current IDP breakdown in Iraq, by ethnicity, includes Arabs (93 percent); Assyrians (four percent); Kurds (one percent); Turkmen (one percent); and others (one percent). Moreover, the proportion of each sect or group displaced in the first half of 2007 roughly matches its proportion of the overall population of Iraq: Shia Muslim (64 percent); Sunni Muslim (32 percent); Christian (four percent); Yazidi (0.01 percent); Sabeian Mandeian (0.002 percent).

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Baghdad) Different Sources, Different Numbers

¶19. (SBU) Although Baghdad province contains only about 25 percent of Iraq,s total population, about 69 percent of Iraqi IDPs displaced since February 2006 originated in Baghdad, according to IOM data . The post-February 2006 displaced from Baghdad numbered approximately 24,376 families (146,256 individuals) by May 10, and rose to 30,000 families (180,000 individuals) on July 16, according to IOM reports for Baghdad, which are based on MoDM estimates from the Ministry,s central office. NGO figures compiled separately from IOM,s data support the IOM statistics. These figures are substantially lower than the number of IDPs registered with the Baghdad Provincial Council and the MoDM Baghdad branch offices, both of which are involved in registering IDPs in Baghdad province.

¶10. (SBU) Statistics gathered from the Provincial Council (PC) and the MoDM Baghdad branch offices indicate much higher levels of displacement over the past four months. The Baghdad Provincial Council's committee for migration and displacement said on September 3 that about 70,000 IDP families (or about 420,000 individuals) are now registered as displaced, up from about 60,000 families at the beginning of August 2007; and up from 43,000 families at the beginning of May 2007. The PC said it started registering displaced families in February or March 2006.

¶11. (U) IOM says that some of the increase in IDP numbers in recent months can be attributed to increased data entry by the MoDM and to the opening of a new branch office in the Karkh district, which facilitates registration for those displaced in or to areas in west Baghdad, particularly Sunni IDPs (who were reluctant to register at an office in a predominantly Shia area of Rusafa, in the eastern side of Baghdad).

¶12. (SBU) A possible explanation for the large discrepancy in IDP numbers provided by IOM and NGOs, on the one hand, and by the Baghdad Provincial Council and the MoDM branch offices, on the other, is that IOM relies primarily on numbers provided by the MoDM central office, which may be using outdated data. In July, for example, the director of the MoDM Rusafa branch office said he had not provided updated data to the central ministry for six months, and that his office had registered about 22,500 additional families since the last time he provided the ministry data. Furthermore, PC numbers are logically higher than MoDM numbers due to a lag in data entry and IDPs dropping out at various stages of the registration process. (See REFs A and B.)

Displacements in Baghdad Continue at a High Rate

¶13. (SBU) Members of the PC committee for displacement and migration have also speculated that some of the increase in IDP registrations may be attributed to new benefits the GoI is considering providing to IDPs, such as a monthly stipend of 150,000 Iraqi Dinar (ID) for a period of six months. However, IDP registration forms ask the applicant when they were displaced, and the directors general of both the Karkh and Rusafa branch offices said most applicants over the past four months claimed they were newly displaced. The director general of the Karkh branch office, which opened March 29, 2007, said that over half of the 5,587 families had registered since June 1. When asked if he thought the registrations reflected &catch up8 since the office had recently opened and provided easier access to those living in west Baghdad, he said the office has consistently processed about 200 IDP files per day and that most of the registrations were newly displaced.

Baghdad) Compensation Paid to Some IDPs

¶14. (SBU) The Council of Ministers has said that it will allocate money to provide the 70,000 displaced families in Baghdad province with a monthly salary of 150,000 Iraqi Dinar (ID) for six months. The PC, the Council of Ministers and MoDM are still discussing how and when the money will be distributed. In a separate initiative to encourage displaced families to return to their homes, the Baghdad governor's office has disbursed payments of one million ID to 2,400 families who have returned to their Baghdad homes. Money has been allocated for 5,000 families to receive the one million ID payment.

Baghdad to Halt IDP Registration

¶15. (SBU) PC members of the committee for displacement and migration told PRTOff on September 3 that the MODM instructed Baghdad,s district and qada councils to stop accepting IDP registrations as of September 20, except for applicants coming from outside Baghdad and applicants displaced from Rashid and Adhamiya. PRTOff visited Abu Ghraib the next day and confirmed with the qada council that they had already received the letter telling them that no more IDP registrations will be accepted after September 20. (Comment: Post attributes this to the GoI being overwhelmed with registrations and looking for a reason to cut them off. Both the Provincial Council and the MoDM Rusafa branch office stopped accepting IDP registrations in August for a period of a couple of weeks in order to give them a chance to catch up with their data entry) which they have still not done, despite having the extra time with no new submissions. End comment.)

Food, Shelter, Employment Needed
USG Responds Through OFDA, NGOs, and IOs

¶16. (U) Both IOM and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) state in June and July reports that approximately 60 percent of post-February 2006 IDPs are living in rented housing, while an additional 20 percent are doubling up with host families or relatives, and the remaining 20 percent comprise a mixture of people living in abandoned public buildings, former military barracks, or tented camps (one percent) scattered around the country. According to NGO surveys, the top three most frequently reported needs in both 2006 and 2007 are food (74 percent), shelter (73 percent), and employment (63 percent), reflecting a largely urban population cut off from homes and sources of income.

¶17. (U) USG assistance to Iraqi IDPs has been administered through humanitarian programs implemented by USAID/DCHA/OFDA and the Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) since 2003. PRM contributed \$37 million to UNHCR,s \$123 million 2007 supplemental appeal for Iraqi refugees in neighboring countries, and \$18.5 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for its \$75.5 million 2007 appeal for conflict victims inside Iraq, some of whom are IDPs. PRM,s total planned funding for FY2007 is \$122.4 million, most of which would go to refugees (as opposed to IDPs). This includes \$1,299,000 for MODM capacity building, which runs through December 2007.

¶18. (U) Focusing largely on post-February 2006 IDPs, USAID/OFDA assists around 500,000 Iraqis, working through five non-governmental organization (NGO) and international organization (IO) partners to implement a program that spans all of Iraq,s 18 governorates and the following sectors: health, water and sanitation, relief item distribution, shelter, income generation, host community support, and data collection and analysis on IDPs conducted by IOM and NGO partners. Some projects are multi-sectoral and a typical example would include expanding a school and upgrading its water and sanitation facilities to accommodate IDP children, while simultaneously providing jobs for IDPs with the work involved and supporting the host community through the school improvements. USAID/OFDA,s 2007 budget of \$63 million includes \$18 million in deobligation and reobligation funds, as well as \$45 million in Supplemental funding. Of this, \$37 million will be obligated in FY07, with \$26 million to be allocated through an Annual Program Statement in October of FY08. USAID/OFDA,s Supplemental request for FY08 is \$60 million.

Public Distribution System Not Reaching Enough IDPs

¶19. (U) According to an April 2007 World Food Program (WFP) assessment, 47 percent of IDPs in Iraq do not have access to the Public Distribution System (PDS), which has provided food baskets to Iraqis since 1995. Other surveys break this down into those with no access and those who report inconsistent access, but the overall figures seem to range from 39-47 percent without access of one kind or another. IOM reports that the inability to access PDS rations is worst in Basra (60 percent with no access), Kirkuk (47 percent), and Babylon (44 percent). The most frequently reported obstacle to PDS access is insecurity along food transportation routes, which prevents food from getting from Baghdad to the governorates, and also at times inhibits the movement of food within

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governorates. The other major obstacle IDPs face is transferring their PDS registration so that they can access the food in their new location. One suggestion that has been raised for addressing this problem is to delink the PDS registration with voting registration, because the fact that they are linked makes some governorates reluctant to register IDPs in their areas of displacement. Another possible, albeit temporary, solution is for WFP to assist the GOI with delivery and distribution. According to UNAMI, WFP has offered the GOI Ministry of Trade assistance with the PDS, but has not received a response.

Ministry Of Displacement and Migration Continues to Struggle

¶20. (SBU) The June 2007 Forced Migration Review, issued by the Refugee Studies Centre states that, regardless of the level of resources available, Iraq still lacks the capacity to plan the programming of those resources to address the needs of its population.⁸ This is an aspect of IDP management and assistance brought to light by the response to the current cholera outbreak in the north of the country and the recent truck bombs in Ninewa. While the current cholera outbreak in Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk is affecting more than the displaced in those areas, its initial stages demonstrated the lack of cohesion both between the national government and the provinces, and among different authorities within governorates. This lack of coordination in turn affects the ability to mount a timely and adequate response to emergencies, including new IDP movements.

¶21. (SBU) Through PRM funding to IOM, the USG has supported capacity building for MODM over the past two years. These efforts do not yet appear to have succeeded in building sufficient capacity in MODM to respond either to crises or to on-going phenomena, such as displacement. IOM has worked to re-draft the institutional mandate (basic law) of the Ministry, and to put together organizational structure, job descriptions, and standard operating procedures, yet none of these have been finalized by the Ministry. MODM has reportedly submitted for review by the Legal Committee of the Council of Ministers a simplified version of the basic law, but it has not been passed. Nor has MODM finalized the national policy on IDPs that UNHCR has worked arduously to draft with the Ministry. The draft policy, which is underpinned by the UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, provides for the establishment of a Strategic Guidance Committee (SGC), to include key Ministries, the Prime Minister's office, and the UN, and the establishment of a National Coordination Committee on Displacement (NCC), which would bring donors and NGOs to the table as well. So far, MODM has held one IDP coordination meeting (on July 9) with the UN, NGOs, and donor governments and, though regular meetings were promised, has not followed through. Part of the problem may be linked to the fact that the MODM Minister (Dr. Abdul Samid Rahman Sultan) is currently leading more than one ministry, as he has also been designated the Minister of Health. The problem, however, seems to be systemic.

¶22. (SBU) IOM has contracted to the International Medical Corps (IMC) to provide technical support and training, and MODM,s focus has at times appeared to be limited to data management. Yet a number of problems persist in the registration of IDPs, in addition to those mentioned above for Baghdad. (Refs C and D) These problems range from governorates granting residence only to IDPs who can prove that they originate from that governorate, to local authorities ordering MODM to cease registration in some governorates (making IDPs ineligible for assistance), to requiring IDPs to be sponsored by someone who lives in the governorate (as in the case of the three northern governorates). An IDP,s ability to register affects his or her access to basic services and food.

Other Humanitarian Actors Have Left Iraq

¶23. (SBU) Much of the traditional international humanitarian community relocated to Amman, Jordan, following the 2003 Canal Hotel bombing in Baghdad that killed 22 UN staff members. Their departure has resulted in a situation in which the bulk of the humanitarian community operates via national staff out of neighboring Jordan, coming and going particularly to Erbil and the north. The geographic divide between humanitarian actors based in Amman and those in Baghdad makes coordination within even the traditional international humanitarian community extremely challenging. Three international NGOs continue to operate in Iraq. As far as USAID/OFDA has been able to ascertain at this point, both

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Medecins Sans Frontiers (MSF)-Switzerland and Qandil, a Swedish NGO, have bases in Dohuk (MSF is operating out of the Dohuk hospital), while MSF-France is in Sulaymaniyah. International NGOs do not appear to have remained in Baghdad.

¶24. (SBU) The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has a total of 60 expatriate delegates working on Iraq in the region. Of that total, 13 are permanently based inside Iraq in the north (Erbil and Sulaymaniyah). The rest of the expatriate contingent is based in Amman and travels into Iraq for periods of time. ICRC currently has 385 local staff in Iraq (this does not include the Iraqi Red Crescent). ICRC offices are in Basra, Najaf, and Baghdad, in addition to the two in the north. ICRC is also establishing offices in Trebil on the border with Jordan and in Arabiya on the border with Syria. Its Iraq program currently stands at \$75 million annually, and it issued a budget extension in May for an additional \$29 million, signaling that the delegation felt comfortable in expanding the operation. ICRC travels in unmarked cars and without armed escorts, but is thinking of slowly starting to introduce the use of its symbol in the north. The ICRC office in Baghdad was bombed in October 2003 and this event is still very much in the minds of the delegates. Hence, they are likely to move quite cautiously before establishing a permanent presence inside Iraq. ICRC is hoping to do so and has been looking at Basra and Najaf as possible entry points, but will not act until the security situation is more conducive to such a move.

¶25. (SBU) There are national NGOs providing humanitarian assistance to IDPs, of which the best known is the Iraqi Red Crescent Organization (IRCO). IRCO is the primary implementing partner of MODM and appears to have a geographic breadth that covers all of Iraq. Though there are positive reports of IRCO distributions of relief items at the provincial level, there are concerns from a number of sources about both the nature of their activities and their lack of accountability with cash contributions. They have also become associated with tented camps as a solution for IDP needs, whereas experience has shown that Iraqis are generally not comfortable with tents as even temporary accommodation; in addition, tents are inappropriate for the extreme weather conditions in Iraq during much of the year. USAID/OFDA

received a report recently that, in one instance, IRCO was not present in a camp it had established and appeared to have abandoned it.

¶26. (SBU) UNHCR is still largely focused on Iraqi refugees, despite its global mandate for IDPs in conflict settings that resulted from reforms of the humanitarian system undertaken as of 2005. Seemingly at odds with the global agreement within the international humanitarian community, UNHCR staff on the ground maintain that the agency's role with relation to IDPs in Iraq is limited to protection, camp management, and emergency shelter, per a division of labor worked out among UN agencies. Still, UNHCR is the only UN operational agency to have placed an expatriate staff member in Baghdad for part of 2007, and although it currently has none in Baghdad, UNHCR has said it intends to place someone long-term as of mid-September. In addition, as stated above, UNHCR has worked closely with MODM to help draft IDP policy. But when pressed as to why UNHCR's \$123 million appeal for Iraq appears exclusively geared toward refugee needs in neighboring countries and the needs of non-Iraqi refugees in Iraq (e.g, Palestinians), with no provisions for IDPs, UNHCR's response is that it can not appeal for what it can not implement, and it can not implement in the current level of insecurity in Iraq.

¶27. (SBU) The UN's international ceiling for Iraq is slated to move from 65 to 95 international staff members in-country (as opposed to Amman). However, UN staffers have privately noted to USAID/OFDA that the bulk of the current staffing allowance is absorbed by security and support units such as fleet management, and that in reality this includes only two international staff from operational agencies in Baghdad) i.e., UNHCR and UNDP) in addition to a small inter-agency team of expatriate staff in Erbil, led by the UNAMI representative (an ex-UNHCR staff member) and including UNHCR and UNDP. Staff have expressed fear that the increase will not significantly improve the UN's capacity to handle IDPs. Other agencies, such as UNICEF and OCHA, have indicated to USAID/OFDA that they strongly prefer to be based in Iraq, but they express frustration with what they describe as repeated denials by UN security officials of their requests for even TDY stints in Baghdad. David Shearer has been appointed as the new Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (D/SRSG) and Humanitarian Coordinator. He

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comes with strong humanitarian credentials, but is to be based in Amman rather than in Baghdad. (He is slated to arrive in Amman on September 12.)

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¶28. (U) The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) began an \$8.6 million program in May for Iraqi refugees in Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. ECHO is reportedly planning an additional \$5.4 million, which will be programmed through the Iraqi Red Crescent. (Note: Some donors are reportedly reluctant to contribute to humanitarian needs in Iraq because Iraq is perceived as a relatively wealthy country and because, in the case of European donors, they see it largely as a U.S. problem. End note.)

Conclusions and Recommendations

¶29. (U) The current trend in net increases of IDP numbers is likely to continue, and the absorptive capacity of host communities will depend on the length of the broader conflict in Iraq. NGO surveys indicate that of Iraqis displaced to another governorate, only 44 percent express the intention to return to their place of origin, while 81 percent of those displaced within their own governorate say they intend to return to their homes of origin, once security permits. Overall, 55 percent of those assessed intend to return to

their place of origin, 23 percent intend to settle in their current location, 19 percent express a desire to resettle in a third location, and two percent were undecided. Given these numbers, the most logical and time-tested strategy is to assist IDPs in place with humanitarian funding, and plan for a return of approximately half of total IDPs with longer-term resources.

¶30. (U) Humanitarian resources generally focus on the most vulnerable. Depending on resources, USAID recommends bolstering the support currently invested in host communities, as this is more sustainable and appropriate than camps or permanent new housing. This support includes enhancing host/guest family and neighborhood support services to provide needed shelter and basic services (to include both non-food items and, for the most vulnerable, food) in a manner that would not be perceived as legitimizing the "permanent" separation/segregation of groups. Not only does permanent new housing exceed current humanitarian resources, but it runs the risk of legitimizing social segregation and permanent demarcation of group boundaries. It is also crucial to repair and upgrade existing housing, which can be done at a relatively low cost, and can be done both quickly and carried out in many areas simultaneously. Such a measure could address and enhance shelter and living conditions for all groups in the short term, and delay the need for highly contentious permanent housing construction. In addition, micro-credit and micro-finance programming, as well as other employment support, should be emphasized. At the same time, USAID and other USG actors should engage in longer-term planning for IDP housing and, where possible, reintegration or resettlement.

¶31. (SBU) USAID further recommends that the USG:

- immediately engage with MODM to continue registration in Baghdad after September 20, and to remove barriers to registration in other provinces;
- work with the GOI Ministry of Trade to accept the World Food Program's offer to assist with the Public Distribution System;
- work with the UN in New York to move the UN Humanitarian Coordinator's base to Baghdad, along with at least one OCHA staff; and
- explore further GOI capacity-building needs at both national and provincial levels for MODM to assist IDPs and respond to emergencies in general.

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